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I. INTRODUCTION

Leon County v. Parker' ("Emerald Acres I") and Emerald Acres
Investments, Inc. v. Board of County Commissioners of Leon County2
("Emerald Acres H") are the stories of two parties' unsuccessful attempts
to obtain meaningful judicial review of adverse administrative actions by the
Leon County government. They are not, to say the least, pretty stories.
Neither are they, in the author's view, the finest hours of Florida's
intermediate appellate courts. The First District Court of Appeal and Leon
County effectively denied both parties access to meaningful judicial review
of adverse administrative action. Although still pending, these rulings
affected both parties' rights to use property.' On the merits, the circuit
court found this action to be a departure from the essential requirements of
law and in violation of Leon County's own ordinances.4 In a remarkable
display of legal legerdemain, the First District transformed the broad access
and remedy provisions of the Local Government Comprehensive Planning
Act5 ("LGCPA") into a legal spring gun that blew the unsuspecting parties
into a legal "twilight zone." These decisions, aside from due process
considerations, raise serious constitutional issues and create further confusion
in the post comprehensive plan legal environment.'
The constitutional issues involve both the appellate rulemaking
authority of the Florida Supreme Court and the constitutional certiorari
jurisdiction of the circuit courts. This paper will initially demonstrate that
the First District was incorrect, and that the remedy provisions are simply
cumulative to common law certiorari review. This argument allows
harmonization of the act's remedy provisions with existing precedent and
avoids the constitutional issues raised by the decisions. The second part of

1. 566 So. 2d 1315 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1990).
2. 601 So. 2d 577 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1992).
3. The First District in Emerald Acres ! denied rehearing, but certified the following
question to the Florida Supreme Court: "Whether the right to petition for common law
certiorari in the circuit courts of the state is still available to a landowner/petitioner who seeks
appellate review of a local government development order finding comprehensive plan
inconsistency, notwithstanding section 163.3215, Florida Statutes (1989)?." Id. at 584.
4. Thus, the circuit court arguably found Leon County's action to be arbitrary and
capricious. See id. One commentator describes this highly deferential standard of review as
a kind ofjudicially imposed lunacy test! MARTIN SHAPIRO, WHO GUARDS THE GUARDIANS?
JUDICIAL CONTROL OF ADMINISTRATION 56 (1988).
5. FLA. STAT. §§ 163.3213, 163.3215 (1991).
6. See John E. Fennelly, Just to Cage the Tiger: ProposedJudicial Resolutions to
Consistency Challenges Under the Local Government Comprehensive Planning and Land
Development Act, 22 STETSON L.REv. 435 (1993).
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the discussion will be directed to the constitutional implications of the
decisions. The initial, or statutory construction, discussion will also require
a detour into the administrative law of access as contrasted with the
traditional notions of standing. In addition, it will be necessary to review
the supreme court's previous treatment of common law certiorari. With the
foregoing framework in mind, Emerald Acres I and II await.

II. THE OPENING STAGE
A. Round One. Administrative Shell Games
Emerald Acres and Parker submitted subdivision applications in
accordance with Leon County's Comprehensive Plan. The County's
Planning Commission, after review, denied the applications. The Commission's stated basis for denial was that the proposed subdivisions were "too
dense when compared with other subdivisions in the area, thus violating" the
comprehensive plan.' The petitioners then sought review of this decision
by the County Commission. The Commission, while upholding the initial
decision, remanded the applications to the Planning Commission. The stated
purpose of the remand was "to advise the respondents as to how the plats
could be corrected to make the proposed subdivisions consistent with the
county's comprehensive plan."' After unsuccessful negotiations, Emerald
Acres sought common law certiorari review in the circuit court. Leon
County, at the outset, moved to dismiss the petition on the basis that
Emerald Acres and Parker had not complied with the notice provisions of
the LGCPA." The circuit court denied the County's motion and proceeded
to a hearing on the merits. The circuit court determined that the County's
denial of the application "was a departure from the essential requirements
of law."'" The court based this determination on relevant portions of the
County's own comprehensive plan. The circuit court found "the fact that
sections 17.1-25(b) and (d) of the ordinance adopting the county's
comprehensive plan provided that zoning classifications existing on the date
of plan adoption would continue to determine allowable land uses until the
zoning was changed.""

7.
8.
9.
10.
11.

Emerald Acres 1,566 So. 2d at 1316.
Id.
See id.
Id.
Id.
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Based on the foregoing plan provisions, the court determined that
"[i]nasmuch as the A-2 zoning classification for the subject properties had
never been changed, and since the proposed subdivision plats were
consistent with such zoning classification[s], . . . the subdivisions were
consistent with the comprehensive plan .... [T]herefore, . . the denials of

based upon inconsistency with the comprehensive plan,
the proposed plats,
12
were erroneous."'

The circuit court, therefore, granted the requested relief. Leon County
appealed, using what would prove to be the spring gun in the LGCPA.
Ironically, the circuit court's factual determination that the County arbitrarily
violated its own plan, has never been challenged or overturned.
B. Round Two: The Spring Gun is Loaded
As indicated, Leon County argued on appeal that the trial court's denial
of its motion to dismiss was error. The County, based on its reading of the
LGCPA remedy provisions, argued that the failure to comply with the time
provisions of the remedy provisions was a complete defense to any judicial
review. The First District agreed with the County's position and reversed.
The First District, in fact, found it unnecessary to "reach the merits of this
determination [comprehensive plan compliance and arbitrary refusal by Leon
County] because we find that the trial court should have granted the
petitioner's [Leon County] motion to dismiss filed in each case for failure
of the respondents [Parker and Emerald Acres] to comply with Section
163.3 125. .

.""

The First District, in reaching this conclusion, rejected

the trial court's conclusion that the statutory remedy provisions of the
LGCPA applied only when local government approved an application and
someone other than the applicant sought to challenge that decision."
The mandatory construction of the time provisions, the First District
argued, were both "reasonable and logical."'" The court reasoned "[a]
local government, such as a county commission, often proceeds in an
informal, free-form manner."" Leon County, the court observed, "[r]ather
than simply deny[ing] the respondent's requests in the cases below . . .
suggested that the respondents meet further with the Planning Commission

12.
13.
14.
15.
16.

Emerald Acres 1, 566 So. 2d at 1316.
Id.
Id. at 1317.
Id.
Id.
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in an effort to work out the differences."' 7 Mandatory reading of the
notice provisions would, therefore, have "the salutary effect of putting such
government body on notice that it should be prepared to defend its action
and will need to create a record to support that action.'
Judge Nimmons,
in dissent, approved the court's interpretation of the statute's remedy
provisions. He would have found the notice provisions applicable only
when "an aggrieved or adversely affected party" institutes an action "where
the local governmental agency has grantedthe applicant's proposal."' 9
Emerald Acres and Parker moved for a rehearing, alleging that they
had complied with the notice provisions, but had inadvertently omitted that
fact in their certiorari petition.20 The First District, in response, denied
rehearing, but indicated that "on remand, the trial court may dismiss the
complaints with leave to amend. If the trial court does grant leave to
amend, Emerald Acres Inc., may . . . have that issue properly before the
trial court for resolution.",2' This set the stage for a judicial coup de grace
to Emerald Acres attempt to obtain meaningful judicial review of Leon
County's denial of their application.
C. Round Three. The Spring Gun is Fired
Emerald Acres dutifully returned to the trial court and filed an amended
petition for certiorari and mandamus. The trial court this time around
dismissed the complaint, finding "that the verified complaint was filed 58
days after the decision of the board, in violation of section 163.3215. "22
The First District affirmed, and rejected Emerald Acres argument that the
statutory notice period did not begin to run until the County's action was

17. EmeraldAcres 1, 566 So. 2d at 1317. It is difficult to follow the logic of the First
District on this issue. If the parties were still trying to resolve the issues, then how could the
ambivalent denial constitute final agency action and trigger the Act's time clock?
18. Id.
19. Id. at 1318 (Nimmons, J., dissenting). Judge Nimmons, in essence, adopted the
board access to non-applicants reading of the LGCPA remedy provisions. This concept will
be the subject of extended discussion. See infra part If.
20. Id.
21. Id.
22. EmeraMdAcres If, 601 So. 2d at 579. As indicated in note 17, and its accompanying
text, the Commission did not simply deny the application, but suggested further meetings
between planners and the applicants. It is difficult to fathom how either applicant could have
a clue that the clock was running. As noted, if the decision was final, what exactly remained
to be worked out? Thus, Leon County's invitation could be viewed fairly as administrative
sandbagging. This makes the result reached by the First District a kind of judicial sanction
for administrative cheap shots.
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reduced to writing and sent to the applicant. "Section 163.3215," the court
noted, "contains no requirement that the 'alleged inconsistent action' be
reduced to writing."23 The court then characterized the statutory notice
provisions as a substantive "condition precedent to instituting a judicial
action ....
2' This characterization of the notice provisions enabled the
court to also reject Emerald Acres' contention that those provisions were an
unconstitutional infringement of the Florida Supreme Court's appellate
rulemaking authority. This last conclusion was an aprioriresult reached
without discussion or analysis that proved the truth of the old philosophy
adage that when you define the terms, you have already won the argument.25
Judge Kahn, who reluctantly concurred on stare decisis principles, was
plainly uncomfortable with the result. 26 In Judge Kahn's opinion, "sufficient cause exists to question the propriety of applying the statute to bar the
present action.' ' 27 The remedy provisions, in his view, should be read
expansively so that "the new statutory remedy may well be seen as cumulative to common law certiorari ....
Judge Kahn reached this conclusion
because common law certiorari was essentially an appellate remedy in the
circuit court, and "it does not follow that the availability of a more
expansive remedy under the statute necessarily abrogates any right to
certiorari review of the local government action. 2 9 Judge Kahn, in
contrast to the majority, viewed the LGCPA remedy provisions as "legislatively establishing the means by which an interested person, not a party to
the proceedings before the local government body, may seek to vindicate
rights that are arguably protected under a previously adopted comprehensive

23. Id. at 580.
24. Id.
25. See KARL N. LLEWELLYN, THE COMMON LAW TRADITION: DECIDING APPEALS, 42
(1960). "[C]ourts do not yet regularly and as of course face up to their job of integrating the
particular statute into the doctrinal whole;" and thus not "implementing the clear purposes
of a statute with the full resources of a court or the matter of recognizing a clear and broad
statutory policy in an apt area even though that area is not embraced by the literal language."
Id. As will be discussed in part IV.B., the First District Court's conclusion on the appellate
rulemaking issue is in direct contradiction to supreme court precedent and fails to integrate
the Act's remedy provisions into the doctrinal whole of judicial review of administrative
action.
26. Emerald Acres It, 601 So. 2d at 581 (Kahn, J., concurring).
27. Id.
28. Id. at 583.
29. Id.
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Judge Kahn also expressed concern that the majority's treatment of the
remedy provisions of the LGCPA raised serious constitutional questions
concerning the legislature's power to limit circuit court common law
certiorari jurisdiction and the supreme court's exclusive appellate rulemaking authority.'
Judge Kahn, to avoid these separation of powers
issues, expressed a preference for the approach used by the Fifth District
Court
of Appeal32 in a similar case, Splash & Ski, Inc. v. Orange Coun33
ty.

The Fifth District, as will be demonstrated, employed an approach that
avoided constitutional problems and afforded the aggrieved parties relief
against another legislatively created spring gun.
D. Splash & Ski: The Spring Gun is Unloaded and Cased
Splash & Ski, Inc., sought a special exception from Orange County to
operate watercraft at "Shooters Waterfront Cafe., 3' The application was
denied, and Splash & Ski petitioned for common law certiorari in accordance with Florida Rule of Appellate Procedure 9.030(c)(3). Splash & Ski
did not, however, comply with the notice provision of the special statute that
permitted certiorari review of County Commission zoning decisions.3 5
Although the record is not clear, the circuit court viewed the statutory
remedy as exclusive and dismissed the petition. The circuit court's view is
36
similar to that of the First District in Emerald Acres I and II.
On appeal, Splash & Ski argued that Orange County's notice provisions
violated article V, sections 2(a) and 5(b) of the Florida Constitution.3 7
Splash & Ski also argued that, even if the provisions were constitutional, the
remedy provided was cumulative to common law certiorari.3 8
30. Id. at 582. Thus, Judge Kahn embraced Judge Nimmons' and the circuit court's
view of the intent of the access provisions in the Act enunciated in Emerald Acres I.
31. Emerala'Acres II, 601 So. 2d at 582; see also supra note 3.
32. Id. at 583.
33. 596 So. 2d 491 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1992).
34. Id. at 493.
35. Id. An early law review article characterized Florida appellate law on certiorari as
"confusing" and that major portions of opinions consist of misleading dicta that "mislead the
Bar and afford the bench 'authority' for later decisions of questionable soundness." William
H. Rogers & Lewis Rhea Baxter, Certiorari in Florida, 4 U. FLA. L. REV. 477, 477 (1951)
(containing an excellent discussion of common law and statutory certiorari).
36. Splash & Ski, 596 So. 2d at 495.
37. Id. at 493.
38. Id.
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Judge Griffin, writing for the court, deftly avoided the constitutional
issues raised by the appeal. She did, however, express serious reservations
concerning the validity of the statutory provision if read so as to eliminate
common law certiorari. Judge Griffin noted pointedly: "If the existence of
Orange County's statutory certiorari procedure were to preclude review by
common law certiorari, the petitioner's argument that the unique requirements of Orange County's special act violate the Florida Constitution would
have to be seriously considered."39
Judge Griffin also took pains to note that, "[w]e are unaware whether
any other county presently has a similar notice requirement."4
This
unique requirement, she noted, "is an effective procedural trap for those who
have not figured out that the requirements for certiorari review by a Florida
court can be found in a county ordinance instead of the Florida appellate
rules."'" The result of those hidden provisions was: "In the rest of the
state, the certiorari jurisdiction of the circuit court is invoked simply by
filing a petition in the circuit court in accordance with the appellate rules
within thirty days. In Orange County, thirty days has shrunk to ten days
",42

The court, however, resolved the apparent conflict by a straightforward
analysis of the proper relationship between statutory and common law
certiorari. That relationship, simply put, is that "[t]he remedy of statutory
certiorari is independent and cumulative to common law certiorari.
Common law certiorari is available if a statutory remedy fails. 43
In Splash & Ski, Judge Griffin also supplied an analytical framework
that can correct the deficiencies in and potential constitutional problems
raised by the First District in Emerald Acres I and 11. Judge Griffen
reasoned "certain statutory notice requirements are substantive, not
procedural, and create a valid condition precedent rather than an impermissible intrusion into the court's exclusive rule making power. 44 These
requirements, however, "are not jurisdictional... [if] a condition precedent
is not met, the court does have jurisdiction of the cause; the case is simply
subject to dismissal if the condition precedent is not satisfied .. .

39. Id. at 494.
40. Id. at 494 n.9.
41. Splash & Ski, 596 So. 2d at 495 n.12.
42. Id.at 494-95.
43. Id.at 494 (citing Battaglia Fruit Co. v. City of Maitland, 530 So. 2d 940, 942 (Fla.
5th Dist. Ct. App.), appeal dismissed, 537 So. 2d 568 (Fla. 1988)).
44. Id. at 495.
45. Id. (citing Hospital Corp. of Am. v. Lindberg, 571 So. 2d 446, 448 (Fla. 1990)).
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In appellate review, on the other hand, a notice requirement, "is not a
condition precedent to accrual of a cause of action."46 Rather, "petitioner's
rights have been determined . . . [and] [w]hat petitioner now seeks is
appellate review of the Board's decision."4 7 The Judge noted: "There are
no substantive 'conditions precedent' to appellate review-the courts are
open to all who follow the appellate rules and pay the filing fee. The state
constitution specifically identifies the time for seeking appellate review to
be a matter of 'practice and procedure."' 4 8
The First District's analysis of the remedy provisions of the LGCPA
has, in light of Splash & Ski, created additional uncertainty in Florida land
use law.49 The district courts are now in conflict over the viability of
common law certiorari in post LGCPA litigation. The initial issue is
primarily legislative intent, while the secondary issues involve significant
constitutional questions arising under the separation of powers doctrine.
They include the constitutional subject matter jurisdiction of the circuit court
and the exclusive appellate rulemaking jurisdiction of the supreme court.
Adequate discussion of the Legislature's intent concerning the remedy
provisions requires a detour into nuances of the administrative law of access
or standing. It will also be necessary to compare, contrast, and distinguish
certiorari from trial proceedings in the circuit court.

III.

STANDING, ACCESS, PARTIES, AND REMEDIES:
A WALK ON THE WILD SIDE OF ADMINISTRATIVE LAW

The LGCPA remedy provisions for review of local government land
use decisions, in essence, are a curious blend of the administrative law of
standing or access and traditional notions of judicial review and remedies.
The Act's provisions in this regard might be likened to a legislatively
created witch's brew of procedural complexity. That cauldron, like

46.
47.
48.
49.
See Lee

Splash & Ski, 596 So. 2d at 495.
Id.
Id. (citing FLA. CONST. art. V, § 2(a)).
The Second and Fifth Districts view common law certiorari as a cumulative remedy.
Ltd. Partnership, 619 So. 2d 996, 999 (Fla. 2d Dist.
County v. Sunbelt Equities, !1,

Ct. App. 1993); Splash & Ski, Inc. v. Orange County, 596 So. 2d 491, 493 (Fla. 5th Dist.
Ct. App. 1992); Snyder v. County Comm'rs, 595 So. 2d 65, 76 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1991 )
overruled by Board of County Comm'rs v. Snyder, 19 Fla. L. Weekly S17 (Oct. 7, 1993).
However, the Fourth District has aligned itself with the First District's approach in Emerald
Acres I and //.See Jensen Beach Land Co. v. Citizens for Responsible Growth of the
Treasure Coast, 608 So. 2d 509 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1992).
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MacBeth's, 0 is now boiling in Florida's appellate courts. A powerful
ingredient in the brew is the question of proper parties in any proceeding
under the Act.
A.

Standing or Access Under the LGCPA." Hail, Hail, the
Gang's All Here

The LGCPA judicial review provisions permit an "aggrieved or
adversely affected party"'" to seek injunctive or other relief against any
local government to prevent such local government from taking any action
on a development order.5 2 An aggrieved or adversely affected party is
defined as "any person or local government which will suffer an adverse
effect to an interest protected or furthered by the local government
comprehensive plan .

. . .""

Protected interests include "health and safety,

police and fire protection service systems, densities or intensities of
development, transportation

facilities, . . . equipment or services, or

environmental or natural resources." 54 These interests, under LGCPA
remedy provisions, "may be shared in common with other members of the
community at large, but shall exceed in degree the general interest in
community good shared by all persons."55 The Act's administrative review
provisions," in turn, allow "substantially affected persons" to challenge
land development decisions in a purely administrative forum. 7
These administrative standing or access concepts were developed to
ensure "[e]xpansion of public access to the activities of governmental
agencies."5 Under Florida's Administrative Procedure Act, these agency
activities are, for the most part, quasi-legislative rulemaking. Substantially
affected persons include trade associations,59 interest groups,6" and even
50. WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, MACBETH act 4, sc. I.
51. FLA. STAT. § 163.3215(1) (1991).
52. Id.
53. Id. § 163.3215(2) (emphasis added).
54. Id.
55. Id. (emphasis added).
56. FLA. STAT. § 163.3213 (1991).
57. Id. § 163.3213(2)(a). This term is not defined in the section and has been the source
of considerable confusion under chapter 120 of the Florida Statutes Administrative Procedure
Act. See Cortese v. School Bd. of Palm Beach County, 425 So. 2d 554, 556 n.4 (Fla. 4th
Dist. Ct. App. 1982) (citing Judith S. Kavanaugh, Administrative Standing Under Chapter
403: What Does the Jerry Case Mean, 53 FLA. B.J. 729, 730-31 (1979)).

58. Florida Home Builders Ass'n v. Department of Labor, 412 So. 2d 351, 352 (Fla.
1982).
59. See id.
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parents of school age children.6' The Act's access or standing definitions
are clearly borrowed and are much broader than classical judicial notions of
standing.62 Indeed, the late Professor Patricia Dore, a leading authority on
the Act and its access provisions, argued that traditional judicial notions of
standing are not applicable in the administrative law context.63 Reviewing
courts, in her view, should disregard those concepts and apply an "access
test" to administrative proceedings.64 The appropriate test employed in a
functional manner looks to the specific statute to determine who should be
granted access to agency rule making.6 5
The LGCPA remedy provision, viewed through the Administrative
Procedure Act's access filter, becomes much more comprehensible. It
emerges as a broad access mechanism that permits interested groups, as
defined by the Act, to mount a challenge to land use decisions of local
governments. Challenges may be mounted in either an administrative or
judicial forum, but the Act's provisions are the exclusive remedy to
interested groups or individuals. The notice provisions, as conditions
precedent to filing, serve the salutary effect of putting a local government
on notice of a possible challenge to a land use decision. 66 To allow a nonapplicant to challenge a land use decision of a local government seems more
consistent with the Act's own terminology. Further, the Act apparently
would allow a legislatively defined adversely affected or aggrieved party to
bring an action or administrative proceeding against a local government
without naming the applicant as a party.67 The applicant could conceivably
intervene in the proceeding but appears not to be an indispensable party.
Judge Kahn's analysis is also supported, once again, by the remedy
terminology of the Act. The Act provides for "injunctive or other relief,"

60. See Farmworkers Rights Org. Inc. v. Department of Health & Rehabilitative Scrvs.,
417 So. 2d 753 (Fla. Ist Dist. Ct. App. 1982).
61. See Cortese, 425 So. 2d at 555.
62. Standing in classical terms is the right of a party to bring or defend a particular
action. As Trawick notes, "[t]o have standing a person must have a cause of action that he
can assert and personal stake in the outcome .... " HENRY P. TRAWICK, FLORIDA PRACTICE
AND PROCEDURE § 4-15 (1992) (emphasis added).
63. See Patricia A. Dore, Access to Florida Administrative Proceedings,13 FLA. ST. U.
L. REV. 967, 993 (1986) (suggesting a functional analysis that will ensure broad access to
agency activity principal rulemaking).
64. Id.
65. Id.at 984-85; see also Stephen T. Maher, We're No Angels: Rulemaking and
Judicial Review in Florida, 18 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 767, 779-83 (1991).
66. See supra text accompanying notes 31-36.
67. See FLA. STAT. § 163.3215(l) (1991).
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that suit under its provision "shall be the sole action available," and that a
"condition precedent" to institution of an action shall be a "verified
complaint."6 This legislative language, together with the broad definition
of adversely affected parties, clearly envisions a trial court remedy for a
non-applicant. Extension of the exclusivity provisions to exclude constitutionally based appellate jurisdiction of the circuit court in common law
certiorari is unwarranted. Indeed, as Judge Griffin persuasively argued in
Splash & Ski,69 common law certiorari is and has been viewed historically
as an appellate remedy.7 ° The Act's language and apparent intent makes
the First District's reading of the remedy provisions problematic at best.

IV. SNYDER AND VAILLANT REVISITED: AN EMERGING TREND
SUPPORTED BY EXISTING PRECEDENT

A. The Emerging Trend
The LGCPA, as has been noted elsewhere, has transformed the post
comprehensive plan land use decisions of local governments." The initial
adoption of the plan, which was a policy or quasi-legislative decision,
zoning or otherwise, is now a quasi-judicial function. 72 The post-plan land
use decision will be measured for compliance with the criteria established
in the plan. This is the much praised and cursed concept of consistency.
Consistency necessarily requires measuring a given post-plan land use decision against a known policy standard, the plan. This fact finding process is
essentially quasi-judicial.
The Fifth District Court of Appeal recognized this fundamental
transformation of the post-plan land use decision in a trail blazing decision,
Snyder v. Board of County Commissioners.73 Snyder was denied rezoning

68. Id. Trawick notes that actions are classified as ex contractu, ex delicto, or statutory.
TRAWICK, supra note 62, § 1-1. Common law certiorari, he notes, "is a form appellate
review but, the proceeding is an original action." Id. § 36-2. Trawick further notes that
"certiorari is a writ issued by a superior court to an inferior court public officer or body to
review a judicial or quasi judicial order or judgment ..... Id.; see also id. §§ 1-5, 6-20.
(supporting Judge Griffin's analysis in Splash & Ski, Inc. v. Orange County, 596 So. 2d 491
(Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1992).
69. Splash & Ski, 596 So. 2d at 491.
70. Id.
71. Fennelly, supra note 6, at 487.
72. Id.at 454.
73. 595 So. 2d 65 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1991).
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by the commission even though his requested land use complied with the
county's comprehensive plan. Snyder unsuccessfully sought review by
common law certiorari in the circuit court. The Fifth District reversed in
what can be fairly characterized as a sophisticated, comprehensive, and
systematic analysis of the impact of the LGCPA on zoning and land use
decisions in the post-plan context.
The Snyder court, employing what it and other courts have characterized as a "functional analysis,"74 first noted that "broad judicial statements
that all rezoning decisions are legislative in nature are out of step with the
realities of zoning practice and the evolvement of zoning law." 75 This
process, the court held, was now a "quasi-judicial review."76 This
conceptual result flowed from the nature of the task performed in the postplan environment. The task, necessarily imposed by the Act, involves
application of a general rule or policy (the plan) to specific individuals,
interests or situations. The application of general policy criteria to a discrete
person, interest, or situation was inherently quasi-judicial.77 Determination
of that general policy, in contrast, is a legislative function. This preliminary
function, under the LGCPA, is performed when the plan is formulated and
then enacted.78
The Second District, in a recent decision, Lee County v. Sunbelt
Equities H, Ltd. Partnership,79 has followed the analytical framework
advanced by the Fifth District in Snyder. The Second District's opinion in
the case candidly recognized that "Florida's appellate courts are neither
unanimous nor consistent on the question whether rezonings are legislative

74. Id. at 78. Lest Professor Dore and the Fifth District be accused of making a doctrine
out of whole cloth, no less a luminary than Benjamin Cardozo found this type of analysis an
improvement in jurisprudence. In 1921, Cardozo argued, "perhaps the most significant
advance in the modem science of the law is the change from the analytical to the functional
attitude. The emphasis has changed from the content of the precept and the existence of the
remedy to the effect of the precept in action and the availability and the efficiency of the
remedy to attain the ends for which the precept was devised." Benjamin N. Cardozo, The
Nature of the JudicialProcess.Lecture 11. The Methods of History, Tradition, and Sociology,
in, CARDOZO ON THE LAW 73 (Legal Classics Library 1982) (quoting Roscoe Pound "The
Administrative Application of Legal Standards," 44 A.B.A. REP. 441, 449 (1919)).

75. Id. at 75.
76. Id.
at 80.
77. Id. at 77.
78. See Carl J.Peckingpaugh, Burden of Proof in Land Use Regulation: A Unified
Approach and Application to Florida, 8 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 499, 504 (1980); DONALD L.
HOROWITZ, THE COURTS AND SOCIAL POLICY 33-45 (1977).
79. 619 So. 2d 996 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1993).

Published by NSUWorks, 1994

13

Nova Law Review, Vol. 18, Iss. 2 [1994], Art. 18
1302

Nova Law Review

[Vol. 18

or quasi-judicial."8 Nor have they, in the Second District's view, been
"consistent about the method or scope of review."'" The court then, after
a discussion of Snyder's analytical framework, agreed that a "functional
analysis' ' 82 was appropriate and that post-plan land use decisions were
"quasi-judicial." 83 This result and approach, to the Second District, led to
"a fair and workable solution"84 to issues raised by the evolving law of
property rights.., that "does not augur well for local governments who are
reluctant to justify their decisions with explicit reference to evidence and
public policy."85 Land use decisions, the court noted, "if reached under a
veil of silence . . . are vulnerable to charges of arbitrariness or improper
motive."86 Based on the foregoing, the Second District concluded "any
party adversely affected by a rezoning decision is entitled to some form of
direct appellate review."87
Applying a functional analysis to common law certiorari in the LGCPA
context leads inexorably to the conclusion that it is essentially an appellate
procedure that reviews administrative action. The scope of that review is,
as Judge Kahn noted, much more limited in nature but is nonetheless a
review." 8 The circuit court is reviewing, in the consistency context, a
factual determination by a local government that a proposed land use is or
is not in compliance with the plan. This analysis of the proceeding is also
consistent with existing supreme court precedent as set forth in the seminal
case of City of Deerfield Beach v. Vaillant. 9
B. The Established Precedent
Vaillant was terminated by the City of Deerfield Beach and unsuccessfully appealed to the Civil Service Board. The board, after a full hearing,
upheld his termination. He then sought and obtained a writ of common law
80. Id. at 1000.
81. Id.
82. Id.at 1001 (quoting David La Croix, The Applicability of CertiorariReview to
Decisions on Rezoning, 65 FLA. B.J. 105 (June 1991).
83. Id.
84. Lee County, 619 So. 2d at 1001. The Second District also stated that it agreed "sitespecific, owner-initiated rezoning requests are sufficiently judicial in character that final
administrative orders are thereafter appropriate for appellate review." Id.
85. Id. at 1002.
86. Id.
87. Id.
88. See Emerald Acres I, 601 So. 2d 577, 583 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1992); see also
supra notes 69, 79, 84 and accompanying text.
89. 419 So. 2d 624 (Fla. 1982).
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certiorari in the circuit court. The City then attempted a plenary appeal in
the Fourth District. Judge Letts, writing for the Court, treated the City's
attempted appeal as a petition for certiorari and denied relief.9" To Judge
Letts, regardless of the nomenclature, the relief sought in the Court was
effectually an appeal. 9 The supreme court, on appeal, followed Judge
Letts' analysis noting "where full review of administrative action is given
in the circuit court as a matter of right, one appealing the circuit court's
judgment is riot entitled to a second full review in the district court."92
The supreme court, in Vaillant, also cited with approval a Third District
decision, Save Brickell Ave., Inc. v. City of Miami.93 Brickell held squarely
that a zoning review in the circuit court was appellate review. 94
The supreme court, in a more recent case, Education Development
Center, Inc. v. City of West Palm Beach Zoning Board of Appeals,95
reaffirmed Vaillant's continuing viability and expressly extended its
rationale to zoning decisions.
Factually, Education Development Center, Inc. obtained certiorari relief
in circuit court from an adverse zoning decision. On appeal, the Fourth
District reversed and remanded the case to the circuit court. The circuit
court, on remand, was to only "review the factual determination made by
the agency and determine whether there is substantial competent evidence
to support the agency's conclusion." 96 On remand, the circuit court found
that there was, no substantial competent evidence to support the agency's
conclusion and again granted certiorari relief.
On review, the Fourth District, undauntedly granted certiorari and
quashed the circuit court's order. The court held:
There was substantial evidence to support denial of the application to
permit the operation of a preschool in this residential area. To find to
the contrary, we conclude that the lower tribunal either reinterpreted the
inferences which the evidence supported or reweighed the evidence; in
either event substituting itsjudgment for that of the zoning board, which

90. City of Deerfield Beach v. Vaillant, 399 So. 2d 1045, 1046 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App.
1981).
91. See Vaillant, 419 So. 2d at 626. Arguably, Judge Letts was also employing a
"functional analysis" to the common law certiorari proceeding in the circuit court.
92. Id.
93. 393 So. 2d 1197 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1981).
94. Id. at 1198 n.I.
95. 541 So. 2d 106, 108 (Fla. 1989).
96. City of W. Palm Beach Zoning Bd. of Appeals v. Education Dev. Ctr., Inc., 504 So.
2d 1385, 1386 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1987).
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it may not properly do.97

The supreme court, on review, in effect struck the Fourth District with
its own Vaillant petard. The supreme court, citing the Fourth District's own
language in Vaillant, reiterated the view that "common sense dictates that
no one enjoys three full appellate reviews . . . ."" The court then clearly
held that "[w]hen the circuit court reviews the decision of an administrative
agency under Florida Rule of Appellate Procedure 9.030(c)(3), there are
three discrete components of its certiorarireview."99 The components are
"whether procedural due process is accorded, whether the essential requirements of the law have been observed, and whether the administrative
findings and judgment are supported by competent substantial evidence."' ° The district court, in its review, is limited to two discrete
components; "whether the circuit court afforded procedural due process and
°
applied the correct law.'' o

V. TOWARD SYNTHESIS

As indicated previously, the LGCPA has injected profound uncertainty
into Florida law. 0 2 Indeed the entire area of land use law has been
described as a legal fault line.0 3 Given the novel and dynamic issues that
are confronting the district courts and the evolving law of property rights it
is not surprising that there is uncertainty. On the issues presented by
Emerald Acres I and II, however, the uncertainty is a direct result of
legislative draftsmanship. The Legislature, by blending administrative law
standing law concepts with traditional common law remedies in the LGCPA,
has thrown the bench and bar a legislative knuckleball. That the First
District went down swinging is thus not the least bit surprising.
97. City of W. Palm Beach Zoning Bd. of Appeals v. Education Dev. Ctr., Inc., 526 So.
2d 775, 777 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1988).
98. Education Dev. Ctr., Inc., 541 So. 2d at 108 (citing City of Deerfield Beach v.
Vaillant, 399 So. 2d 1045, 1047 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1981)).
99. Id. at 108 (emphasis added).
100. Id. (citing Vaillant, 419 So. 2d at 626).
101. Id.
102. See supra text accompanying notes 6, 50.
103. John R. Nolon, Footprintsin the Shifting Sands of the Isle of Palms: A Practical
Analysis of Regulatory Takings Cases, 8 J. LAND USE & ENVTL. L. 16 (1992). "We as a
society have not resolved the tension between property law and environmental rights.
Controversies abound . . . the dispute ... is a tremor running along a deep fault line in
American Society." Id.
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Emerald Acres I and II are not any less troublesome to say the least.
First, the First District has badly misconstrued legislative intent with regard
to the remedy provisions. There is, as indicated earlier, no basis for the
court's conclusion that the Legislature intended to attempt a curtailment of
common law certiorari. It is simply not there and the court was clearly
guilty of apriori reasoning. It assumed the premise and reasoned formally
to a conclusion. Professor Karl N. Llewellyn characterized this type of
decision as a formal"°4 decision making that ignored what he described as
the situation sense" 5 of a case. Holmes even more bluntly called decision
making of this nature "unconscious"'' 6 because it ignored existing supreme
court precedent as expressed in Vaillant and its progeny. Precedent clearly
viewed common law certiorari as an appellate proceeding. This in turn, has
resulted in decisions that fail to adequately distinguish between the trial and
appellate functions and jurisdiction of the circuit court. Finally, the
decisions have needlessly created separation of powers issues that potentially
threaten the constitutionality of the LGCPA's remedy provisions.
The supreme court can, in the Llewellyn sense, tidy up this area by
looking to the policy implications of the act and its own existing precedent.
Llewellyn described this as appellate judging in the grand tradition-a
Cardozo-like "drive to give clear and reasoned guidance for a whole typesituation.., wisdom in judging where sound guidance lay... sensitivity to
equities . . . subtlety of craftsmanship . ... ""' This type of approach
should recognize that the remedy provisions of the LGCPA were intended
to permit broad access to defined groups. Access that would allow them,
in compliance with the act conditions precedent, to challenge local governmental land use decisions. This reading of the Act's remedy provisions is
consistent with, as Llewellyn describes it, the situation sense of the Act.
This interpretation would also leave intact the applicant's right to challenge

104.

KARL N. LLEWELLYN, THE COMMON LAW TRADITION:

DECIDING APPEALS 38

(1960). In the formal style "[olpinions run in deductive form with an air or expression of
single-line inevitability." Id.
105. Id. at 143. "[S]tress in first instance on the problem-situation as a type, with quest
for a sound and guidesome form of rule to govern .
" in.
In other words, examine LGCPA
in light of the purpose of the statute as a whole and in view of existing precedent defining
and explaining certiorari. Id.
106. Perhaps of the reasons judges do not like to discuss policy or to put a decision in
terms of their views as lawmakers, is that the moment you leave the path of merely logical
deduction, you loose the illusion of certainty which makes legal reasoning seem like
mathematics. But that certainty is only an illusion nevertheless. OLIVER W. HOLMES, JR.,
THE PATH OF THE LAW, IN THE COMMON LAW AND OTHER WRITINGS 126 (1982).
107. LLEWELLYN, supra note 104, at 443.
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a land use decision by common law certiorari, and avoid the constitutional
issues raised necessarily in Emerald Acres I and I.
If, however, the supreme court accepts the First District's interpretation
of the Act's remedy provisions, then it would appear inevitable that the
constitutional issues alluded to by Judges Griffin and Kahn will have to be
addressed. The balance of this article will, therefore, address these issues.

VI. THE CONSTITUTIONAL QUAGMIRE
The separation of powers doctrine is a basic principle that underlies
both the Constitutions of the United States and the State of Florida. The
doctrine envisions a division of sovereign power between three distinct
branches of government:
Executive, Legislative and Judicial.
The
placement of powers in one branch, because of constitutional supremacy,
precludes alteration of the division except by constitutional alteration. Thus,
neither Congress nor the State Legislature may alter or exercise powers
proper to a coordinate branch of government.1" 8 Simply put, the Legislature can not decide a negligence case and the Supreme Court can not pass
a state budget. Nor can one branch alter the constitutional functions of
another branch.
The doctrine outlined by Madison in The FederalistPapers received
constitutional recognition in the seminal case of Marbury v. Madison. °9
Congress had attempted in the Judiciary Act of 1789 to expand the court's
jurisdiction to allow the court to issue writs of mandamus. Chief Justice
Marshall and the Supreme Court, quite simply, would have none of it. The
Constitution, he argued, assigns and limits governmental power. Thus, since
the Constitution is the "paramount law,"''0 a "law repugnant to the
[C]onstitution is void."'' . Although the Constitution is paramount, the
instrument itself can still be "looked into" in cases arising under the
Constitution.
Florida's constitutional framers were even more explicit. Article II,
section 3 (branches of government) provides that "[t]he power of the state
108. Separation of powers in Madison's view was a basic bulwark against tyranny. Thus
he observed in The FederalistNo. 47 that "[t]he accumulation of all powers, legislative,
executive and judiciary in the same hands, whether of one, a few or many ... may justly be
pronounced the very definition of tyranny." MICHAEL KAMMEN, THE ORIGINS OF THE
AMERICAN CONSTITUTION 187 (1986).

109. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
110. Id. at 177.
111. Id.at 180.
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government shall be divided into legislative, executive and judicial branches.
No person belonging to one branch shall exercise any powers appertaining
to either of the other branches unless expressly provided herein." '
Despite this explicit prohibition, however, the supreme court has had
to periodically grapple with legislative attempts to directly or indirectly limit
or expand the jurisdiction of the courts. 13 In each instance, the Florida
Supreme Court has resisted any legislative attempt to alter the jurisdiction
conferred by the constitution on the courts of this state.
City of Dunedin v. Bense"4 is illustrative and bears a striking resemblance to Marbury v. Madison. In Bense, the Legislature had attempted to
give the supreme court "'original jurisdiction ...by injunction or other
appropriate remedy' to prohibit the filing of any action attacking the validity
of a validation decree except in the manner provided in this section." ' 5
The supreme court in Bense recognized as a benchmark principle of
constitutional jurisdiction that "[n]either this court nor the Legislature has
the power to extend the jurisdiction of this court beyond the confines of the
constitutional prescription.""' 6 The court also recognized that "the Legislature must function within the orbit prescribed by the Constitution.""' 7
The supreme court, in tones similar to Marshall's, flatly rejected the
attempt, holding: "jurisdiction of the Supreme Court is conferred by the
Constitution itself. It is not endowed with any common-law prerogative
outside of the boundaries established by organic law. Certainly the appellate
jurisdiction is clearly defined. Its original jurisdiction is stated with equal
clarity." 8 The Legislature, the court held, "has no power to extend
jurisdiction of the Supreme Court beyond that defined in the Constitution.""' 9 Any contrary conclusion, the court noted, "would necessarily
ignore the historical doctrine of separation of powers that is so fundamental
to our democratic system."' 2 ° Failure to resist would "be authority to the
legislative branch of the government to regulate and control the constitu-

112. FLA. CONST. art. 11,§ 3.
113. Perhaps it would be appropriate to expand the famous adage that no one's life,
liberty, or property are safe while the Florida Legislature is in session to include "nor
Constitutional form of government."
114. 90 So, 2d 300 (Fla. 1956).
115. Id. at 301. The statute in question concerned causeway and island improvement
revenue bonds. The court recognized the public interest in prompt validation. Id. at 301-02.
116. Id. at 302.
117. Id.
118. Bense, 90 So. 2d at 302.
119. Id.
120. Id. at 302-03.

Published by NSUWorks, 1994

19

Nova Law Review, Vol. 18, Iss. 2 [1994], Art. 18

1308

Nova Law Review

[Vol. 18

tional jurisdiction of the judicial branch."''
The converse of the foregoing principle would appear equally valid.
If the Legislature could by simple legislative fiat disregard constitutional
limitations and expand a court's subject matter jurisdiction, it could with
equal impunity limit jurisdiction or constitutionally based remedies, such as,
injunction.
The supreme court has also resisted this latter notion as well as the
former, at least with regard to its own jurisdiction.' 22 In Sun Insurance
Office, Ltd. v. Clay, 23 Chief Justice Roberts stated "it has been many
times held by this court that ... the Legislature cannot restrict or take away
jurisdiction conferred by the constitution....
Article V, section 5 of the Florida Constitution vests circuit courts with
both jurisdiction to issue writs of certiorari and the power of direct review
of administrative action prescribed by general law.'25 The analogy
provided by Bense and Clay therefore, would seem clear. The Legislature
must also move within its proper orbit concerning the constitutional
jurisdiction of the circuit court. The constitution, the paramount document,
precludes any legislative attempts to curtail jurisdiction, to issue writs of
certiorari. Jurisdiction, it should be added, that the supreme court has
clearly characterized as appellate in nature.
The Legislature, from a functional standpoint, can create a substantive
right and remedy. Thus, the remedy provisions of the LGCPA should be
viewed as a legislatively created cause of action. As such, as Judge Griffin
noted, it exists apart and totally separate from the circuit court's appellate
jurisdiction, i.e., the power to issue writs of certiorari and review administrative action.116 The circuit court's jurisdiction, from a functional
standpoint, can be viewed as two dimensional. The remedy provisions of
the LGCPA, it is argued, properly belong in this first dimension. The
second, equally constitutionally based dimension of jurisdiction, implicates
circuit court appellate jurisdiction. Both dimensions, it is argued, exist

121. Id. at 303.
122. Cardozo described this tendency to extend itself along the lines of logical
development as "an intellectual passion for elegantia juris, for symmetry of form and
substance." Benjamin N. Cardozo, The Nature of the Judicial Process. Lecture I.
Introduction. The Method of Philosophy, in, CARDOZO ON THE LAW, supra note 74, at 34
n.28 (quoting W.G. Miller in THE DATA OF JURISPRUDENCE).
123. 133 So. 2d 735 (Fla. 1961).
124. Id. at 742. The holding in Clay seems to conflict with the holding in Bense. In
the view of the Clay court, however, Bense was not controlling. Id. at 741.
125. FLA. CONST. art. V, § 5.
126. See supra text accompanying notes 40-47.
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independently of each other and are functionally distinct. In essence the
First District, in Emerald Acres I and II, has ignored the distinction and
collapsed the circuit court's appellate jurisdiction into its trial jurisdiction.
This is a scrambled and impermissible result at variance with the constitution and supreme court precedent as expressed in Vaillant and its progeny.
A. Legislatively EstablishedAppellate Filing Times
As discussed previously,'27 if the time requirements governing the
remedy provisions are viewed from the circuit court's trial court dimension,
then the result reached in EmeraldAcres appears sound. Quite another issue
is presented if the remedy provisions' time requirements are viewed as also
controlling common law certiorari in circuit court. To reiterate, the supreme
court has consistently treated certiorari as an appellate remedy governed by
the Rules of Appellate Procedure. 12 The constitution in article V, section
2(a) vests the supreme court with jurisdiction to "adopt rules for [the]
practice and procedure in all courts including the timefor seeking appellate
review."129 'The filing periods, therefore, when viewed from the second
or appellate dimension, intrude on the supreme court's rulemaking authority
and raise a clear separation of powers issue. The supreme court has historically treated appellate filing requirements as a procedural matter exclusively
within its constitutional sphere of authority. 3 '
This historical treatment of legislatively imposed appellate filing
requirements continues to be followed.' 3 ' The Fourth District Court of
Appeal in no uncertain terms noted "the Florida Constitution, Article V,
Section 2(a), provides that the Supreme Court shall adopt rules of procedure
in all courts, 'including the time for seeking appellate review.' Matters of
practice and procedure within the authority of the Supreme Court may not
be exercised by the Legislature."'3 2 The court found any explicit or
implicit attempt of the Legislature to extend the time for direct appeal would
be untimely.'33
Given the historical treatment of circuit court certiorari as an appellate
remedy and the supreme court's previous reaction to legislatively imposed
127. See supra notes 44-47 and accompanying text.
128. See supra text accompanying note 101.
129. FLA. CONST. art. V, § 2(a) (emphasis added).
130. See Markert v. Johnston, 367 So. 2d 1003, 1005 n.8 (Fla. 1978).
131. See In re Adoption of a Minor Child, 570 So. 2d 340, 342 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App.
1990), aff'd, 593 So. 2d 185 (Fla. 1991).
132. Id. (quoting FLA. CONST. art. V, § 2(a)).
133. Id.
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appellate filing requirements, the result in Emerald Acres I and II appears
even more tenuous. Affirmance would require that the supreme court ignore
its own precedent concerning the nature of certiorari, and accept legislative
intrusion into its rulemaking authority. This, on separation of powers
grounds, the court has consistently refused to allow the Legislature to do.

VII. POST SCRIPT: THE FEDERAL SPECTER

Parker, one of the parties in Emerald Acres I, fared much better in the
federal court. The Estate and Parker, frustrated in their attempts for
meaningful judicial review in state court, brought an action in district court.
Parker alleged Leon County's actions were "arbitrary and capricious," and
deprived them of both due process and equal protection under the Fourteenth Amendment.'
The district court agreed and granted summary
judgment against the County.'
The district court, in a comprehensive
and systematic opinion, noted that while a federal court's role in reviewing
zoning cases is limited, "'deprivation [of a property interest] is of constitutional stature if it is undertaken for an improper motive and by means that
were pretextual, arbitrary and capricious, and without rational basis."" 36
It would appear, therefore, that Florida appellate courts are unwilling
or unable to provide relief to litigants who are subjected, in the LGCPA
context, to arbitrary and irrational administrative action by state and local
agencies, the federal courts are an alternative forum. This conclusion is
warranted by the district court decisions and the Supreme Court's recent
decision in Lucas v. South CarolinaCoastal Council.'3 7

VIII. CONCLUSION
The recent decisions of the First District in Emerald Acres I and II are
at variance with the legislative intent of the LGCPA and of established
Florida constitutional jurisprudence. Hopefully, the supreme court will

134. Parker v. Leon County, No. TCA 91-40133-WS, 1992 WL 209626, at *2 (N.D.
Fla. March 18, 1992).
135. Id. at *5.
136. Id,at *7 (quoting Executive 100, Inc. v. Martin County, 922 F.2d 1536, 1541 (11th
Cir.), cert. denied, 112 S.Ct. 55 (1991)).
137. 112 S.Ct. 2886 (1992).
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quickly correct the error. 3 Failure to do so could result in wholesale
federal intervention in cases of this nature. A minor correction could,
however, correct the problem and insure that Florida's courts are available
to protect all Floridians from the arbitrary and unreasonable exercise of state
power.

138. Since this article was written, the Florida Supreme Court determined that common
law certiorari was available to a property owner seeking to challenge adverse administrative
action under the LGCPA. Parker v. Leon County, Nos. 80230, 80288, 1993 WL 530281, at
*4 (Fla. Oct. 7, 1993). The court further restricted access to the Act's remedy provisions to
third party non-applicants. Id. at *3. The court did not, however, reach the constitutional
issues raised in this article.
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